

A review of single and multi-hazard risk assessment approaches for critical infrastructures protection

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (CI)
A system which must be constantly monitored because its destruction or interruption of service brings to a weakening of the efficiency of a city or of an entire country

is subject to

- NATURAL HAZARDS**
Dangers whose origin becomes from nature. Examples of natural hazards are hurricanes, floods, landslides, etc.
- MAN-MADE HAZARDS**
Dangers whose origin is anthropogenic. Examples of man-made hazards are terroristic attacks, crimes, etc.



Data Collection

brings to

POOR DATA
Data must be integrated thanks to **expert judgment**. This subjective knowledge is supported by:
• Bayes' theorem
• Probability bound analysis

RICH DATA
Data can be objectively stored thanks to **triplets**:
 $\langle s_i; p_i; x_i \rangle$
• $s_i \rightarrow i$ -th scenario;
• $p_i \rightarrow$ probability of i -th scenario;
• $x_i \rightarrow$ effect of the i -th scenario.

Multi-Hazard Interactions

split into

INDEPENDENT EVENTS
Considering the events as **independent** is less complex, but brings to underestimate risk. The method used is the total exceedance probability:
$$P(L_j)_{TOT} = 1 - \prod (1 - P_i(L_j))$$

CORRELATED EVENTS
Considering the events as **correlated** is more accurate, but the cases to consider are a lot:
• Unidirectional vs. bidirectional hazards
• Triggering vs. increased probability vs. catalysis or impedance
Conditional probability is then used

Depending on the quantity of data available and on the type of interactions, it is possible choosing the best methodology to use for the single or multi-hazard problem faced

Methodologies

MATHEMATICAL AND STATISTICAL METHODS	MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES	GRAPHS AND NETWORKS APPROACH
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Logarithmic regression Early warning index calculation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Artificial Neural Network (ANN) Support Vector Machine (SVM) Boosted Regression Tree (BRT) Generalized Additive Model (GAM) Genetic Algorithm Rule-Set Production (GARP) Quick Unbiased Efficient Statistical Tree (QUEST) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Game theory technique Classical complex networks methodology Multi-level complex network formulation

Pros & Cons

MATHEMATICAL AND STATISTICAL METHODS	MACHINE LEARNING TECHNIQUES	GRAPHS AND NETWORKS APPROACH
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BBNs work well with few data and capture the dependencies among variables The logarithmic regression gives good results even with poor data accompanied by expert opinions The early warning index highlights well the correlations among variables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ANNs find amazing results also with poor data and are very good for evaluating correlations SVM, BRT and GAM sometimes show good performance for the hazards predicted GARP and QUEST requires a little quantity of data and are very quick methodologies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Game theory model is easy to build and can be used for more hazards together Classical complex network requires few data Multi-level complex network performs well both with small and with large data sets and is able to deal with interdependencies among different hazards
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The more complex a BBN, the more data are required The logarithmic regression does not capture well the interdependencies among variables The early warning index calculation requires lots of data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ANNs perform badly with too many variables and are able to predict one hazard at a time SVM, BRT and GAM can consider one hazard at a time and can show weak results for the hazards predicted GARP and QUEST deals with one hazard at a time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Game theory needs expert judgement Classical complex network works with one hazard at a time Multi-level complex network is used only with time series with the same number of elements

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